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Abstract In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–
315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability
to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly com-
mitting a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example
featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that,
in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suit-
ably chosen propositions than to one of the conjuncts. By pointing out the similarities
between Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment and our example, we argue that the par-
ticipants in the experiment may assign probabilities to the propositions in question in
such a way that it is also rational for them to give the conjunction a higher probability
than one of the conjuncts.
Keywords Conjunction fallacy · Linda problem · Psychology of reasoning ·
Bayesian epistemology
1 Introduction
In recent years, a famous experiment of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) has attracted
the attention of formal epistemologists.1 In the experiment participants are provided
1 See Crupi et al. (2008) and the contributions to this special issue. For a recent review of the cognitive
science literature on the conjunction fallacy, see Hertwig et al. (2008). For a recent review of Bayesian
epistemology, see Hájek and Hartmann (2009).
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with information about a woman named Linda: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken
and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations. The participants are then asked to rank the following statements in
terms of their probability:
i) Linda is a bank teller.
ii) Linda is bank teller and Linda is a feminist.
In the experiment, Tversky and Kahneman found that the majority of the partici-
pants ranked the second statement as more probable than the first. As it is a law of
probability that the probability of the conjunction of two propositions cannot be larger
than the probability of any of the conjuncts, it seems inevitable to conclude that in
some cases people behave in violation of the laws of probability.
However, the fact that a conjunction can never be more probable than one of its
conjuncts only holds in a ceteris paribus sense: that is, we should assume that all rel-
evant factors are equal in the case that we compare the probability of the conjunction
to the probability of one of its conjuncts. That this is not a mute point is shown by
the recent discussion in epistemology about whether coherence can be a truth condu-
cive property of an information set. In their (1994), Klein and Warfield use the same
theorem of the probability calculus to show that coherence cannot be truth conducive
in the sense that a more coherent information set will also have a higher probability.
For, as they argue, in some cases the coherence of an information set can increase by
adding a proposition to the set. But as a conjunction cannot be more probable than
any of its conjuncts, the new set cannot be more probable and, therefore, coherence
cannot be truth conducive.
However, as Bovens and Olsson (2000) have pointed out, Klein and Warfield’s
argument no longer works if we do not consider the propositions on their own, but
instead as reports by different sources. For if each proposition is reported by a source,
then the background conditions in the case of the conjunction are different from those
in case of each of its conjuncts: in the first case we have two reports, while in the
second only one. And then the condition that all relevant factors must be equal no
longer holds. Since then, this approach to analyzing the relation between coherence
and probability has been further elaborated upon in various other publications.2
In this paper we will apply the same approach to a thought experiment that is similar
to Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda experiment. We will show that for this example at
least, we can present a model similar to the one used in the coherence discussion accord-
ing to which the participants are rational in preferring the conjunction over one of its
conjuncts. The example we present will be slightly different from the Linda example.
So the conclusion that the participants are rational in our example does not immediately
tell us anything about the Linda example. Nonetheless, we will argue in the last two
sections that the two examples are much more similar than one may have imagined.
2 See, for instance, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Meijs (2006, 2009). Meijs and Douven (2007) and
Olsson (2005) argue that coherence is not truth conducive, even if Klein and Warfield’s dismissal was too
quick.
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2 Walter the banker
Consider the following situation:
Suppose you are a philosopher who knows a little, but not much about the current
status of formal epistemology. Suppose also that you are intimately connected
with the university of Leuven, and that through this you know that there will be a
conference on probabilistic paradoxes next week. Suppose that on one morning
you meet a stranger in the commuter train to his work and you start talking.
Now suppose that when the stranger finds out that you are a philosopher, he
starts talking about an acquaintance of his, who happens to be a philosopher as
well. In summary, you learn that this guy’s name is Walter, that he is 31 years
old, outspoken, bright, with a background in philosophy and physics (“would
you believe that?!”—the stranger exclaims) and did some work on probabilistic
modeling. The stranger continues to make some comments about the merits of
formal epistemology in general and then proceeds to inform you that, by the way,
Walter is a banker, working as a manager for one of the world’s largest finan-
cial services providers. Now suppose you arrive at your stop and after saying
goodbye, you leave the train. Call this scenario 1.
Now consider scenario 2, which is like scenario 1, but before you say your
goodbyes, the stranger mentions one more fact: that Walter will be speaking at
a conference in Leuven next week.
Clearly, this example is quite similar to the Linda example. But there are also a
number of important differences between the two examples. First, in the Walter exam-
ple we have a clear source who reports the information and the credibility we assign
to that source is crucial for determining the probability that what he reports is true.
Second, there is a difference in how we should treat the background information.
In the Linda case, the information provided about Linda is presented as being beyond
doubt – the participants should assign unit probability to these statements. In the cur-
rent example, this is not the case: the information provided about Walter being bright,
outspoken, etc., is just as much part of the story as the rest of the information.
Third, intuitively, it is no longer clear whether it is irrational to assign a higher
probability to the information reported in the second scenario of the Walter example
than to the information reported in the first. And, as the next section will show, the
laws of probability may actually support this statement.
3 Walter formalized
It goes without saying that we will not propose to change one of the axioms of prob-
ability theory in this paper. But as we saw, the fact that the probability of a conjunct
cannot be higher than the probability of any of its conjuncts only holds ceteris pari-
bus. In the Walter example there is an explicit mention of the source that reports the
information, the “stranger” that you meet in the train. And when we condition on the
reports of the stranger, it no longer needs to be the case that the probability of the
conjunct is equal to or larger than the probability of each of the conjuncts.
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To formalize this, we first define the following propositions:
H1: Walter is 31 years old, outspoken, bright, and has a background in physics and
philosophy.
H2: Walter works at a bank.
H3: Walter attends a conference on formal epistemology in Leuven.
These propositions represent facts. Note that the first scenario is represented
by the set S I := {H1, H2} and the second scenario is represented by the set
SI I := {H1, H2, H3}.
Next, we define propositions that represent reports: Ri is the proposition that the
stranger reports that Hi is the case. For example, R2 stands for “The stranger reports
that Walter works at a bank”.
We will then show that it can be the case that
p(H1, H2, H3 | R1, R2, R3) > p(H1, H2|R1, R2) (1)
for plausible probability distributions.3 Hence, the probability of the conjunction of
three propositions can be larger than the probability of two of the conjuncts, if one
conditions on the corresponding reports.
The value of a posterior probability, such as p(H1, H2|R1, R2), depends critically
on the credibility of the witness. If we know, for instance, for certain that the witness
always and only report the truth, then the posterior probability will be unity. If, on the
other hand, we know that the witness is fully untrustworthy, then the posterior prob-
ability will equal the prior probability p(H1, H2): the reports do not tell us anything
about the facts in question.
Moreover, if the reports of the witness are fully dependent on one another, then the
second, third, etc, witness reports will not add anything to the value of the posterior
probability. The more independent the witness reports are, the larger the posterior
probability, ceteris paribus.
In the remainder of this section we will construct a model that allows us to study the
case at hand in detail. To do so, we propose an account of witness credibility and show
how different independent reports of one partially reliable witness can be combined.
We will then show that for plausible probability distributions over the different prop-
ositions, we will be more justified in believing information set SI I than information
set SI .
It proves useful to introduce the following binary propositional variables: For
i = 1, . . . , n, let us call Hi (in italics) a fact variable and Ri a report variable.
Hi can take two values: Hi and ¬Hi (both in roman script). Similarly, Ri can take
two values: Ri and ¬Ri . Ri is the proposition that, after consultation with the proper
source, there is a report to the effect that Hi is the case. ¬Ri is the proposition that, after
consultation with the proper source, there is no report to the effect that Hi is the case.
3 Here p(A, B) denotes the probability of the conjunction of the propositions A and B. p(A) is the prior
probability of A, and p(A|B) is the posterior probability of A given B.
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Witness credibility. There are various ways to model the credibility of a witness.4
Following the ‘Scandinavian School of Evidentiary Value’ (see Hansson 1983), we
assume that a witness is either reliable or unreliable. If the witness is reliable, he is
a truth-teller. If the witness is unreliable, learning about his report does not teach us
anything about the hypothesis. In this case, the witness randomizes.
To formalize this, we introduce a further binary propositional variable: The reli-
ability variable Rel, which can take two values: Rel is the proposition that the witness
is reliable (and, hence, a truth-teller), and ¬Rel is the proposition that the witness is
not reliable (and, hence, a randomizer).We then set for all i, j = 1, . . . , n:
p(Ri|Hj, Rel) = δi j , p(Ri|Hj,¬Rel) = ai j (2)
The parameter ai j is called the randomization parameter.5 Following Olsson (2005),
we set for all i, j = 1, . . . , n:
ai j = p(Hj) (3)
This choice makes sense in our case: Without any additional information, a witness
will randomize on the basis of his prior beliefs (see also Bovens and Hartmann 2003,
ch. 5).
Independence conditions. Next, we formalize what it means that different reports
are probabilistically independent. To do so, we introduce further propositional vari-
ables.
We make the following assumptions: First, each fact variable is independent of the
credibility of the witness. In formal notation and for all i, j = 1, . . . , n:
Hi ⊥Rel (4)
In terms of probabilities, this requirement amounts to:
p(Hi|Rel) = p(Hi) (5)
Intuitively, this assumption makes sense: learning something about the credibility of
a witness should not tell us anything about the probability of a proposition without a
report by the witness.
Second, the witness report is independent of all other witness reports, given the
(values of the) corresponding fact and the reliability variables. Put formally, we
consider the case that the witness makes n reports and assume for all i ,
Ri ⊥R1, . . . , Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . Rn|Hi , Rel. (6)
4 See Bovens and Hartmann (2003) for a discussion of several options.
5 The “Kronecker delta” δi j equals 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise.
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In terms of probabilities, this condition amounts to
p(Ri|R1, . . . Ri−1, Ri+1, . . . , Rn, Hi, Rel) = p(Ri|Hi, Rel). (7)
For a similar condition, (see Bovens and Hartmann 2003: 65).
Note that the probabilistic versions of conditions (4) and (6) hold for all instanti-
ations of the corresponding propositional variables (see Bovens and Hartmann 2003,
ch. 3).
Our independence condition (6) may be somewhat difficult to read and the reader
may wonder why we would not opt for a simpler proposal such as for all i, j =
1, . . . , n,
Ri ⊥R j (8)
or, probabilistically,
p(Ri |Rj) = p(Ri). (9)
However, this condition would be too strict since it would exclude the possibility
that a report can increase the probability that the witness is a truth teller, which in turn
may influence the probability of a next report. More specifically, it may increase or
decrease it, depending on the prior probability of that proposition.6
There is also a more pragmatic defense of our independence condition (6). For the
only reason to disagree with an independence condition is if it would be unreasonable
to assume that the reports are independent in the sense specified by the condition.
Therefore, we have an a priori reason to prefer a weaker condition over a stronger. The
only reason not to drop the independence condition completely is that in that case we
would never see an increase in probability at all.
The independence conditions (4) and (6) and our model for the witness credibility
are captured by the Bayesian network represented in Fig. 1.
The posterior probability. In Appendix A we show that given the above con-
ditions, we can derive an expression for the posterior probability p∗(S) := p(H1,
. . . , Hn|R1, . . . , Rn) of an information set S := {H1, . . . , Hn} given a corresponding
set of reports R := {R1, . . . , Rn}. Although the derivation can be done without the
theory of Bayesian networks, it turns out that the calculation simplifies considerably
if we use this powerful tool. We obtain:
p∗(S) = p(Rel) + p(H0) · · · p(Hn) p(¬Rel)
p(S) p(Rel) + p(H0) · · · p(Hn) p(¬Rel) p(S) (10)
With this expression we can determine the posterior probability of both scenarios
involving Walter the Banker:
6 This case is argued at length in Meijs (2009).
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Fig. 1 The Bayesian network
representing our witness
scenario. The dashed lines
connecting the Hi s represent any
arrows between the various fact
variables
p∗(SI ) = p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2) p(¬Rel)p(H1, H2) p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2) p(¬Rel) p(H1, H2) (11)
p∗(SI I ) = p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2) p(H3) p(¬Rel)p(H1, H2, H3) p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2) p(H3) p(¬Rel) p(H1, H2, H3)
(12)
The difference function. Note that set SI I is more probable than set SI if and only
if the difference function
D(SI ,SI I ) := p∗(SI I ) − p∗(SI ) (13)
is positive. The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for
the positivity of the difference function.
Theorem D(SI ,SI I ) > 0 if and only if p(H3|H1, H2) > p(H3) · (1 + δ) with the
error measure
δ = p(H1, H2) p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2) (1 − p(Rel))[
1 − p(H1, H2) (1 − p(H3))
]
p(Rel) + p(H1) p(H2)p(H3) (1 − p(Rel))
· (1−p(H3)).
Note that δ  1 if p(H1), p(H2) and p(H1, H2) are small and if (approximately)
p(Rel) ≥ .5. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion and the proof of the theorem.
To understand the theorem and its relevance, note that the principle at work in
our example is that H1 and H3 positively support each other, while H1 and H2 are
negatively relevant for each other. That is, we have:
(a) p(H2 | H1) < p(H2)
(b) p(H3 | H1) > p(H3)
The main condition in the theorem (neglecting the error term),
(c) p(H3|H1, H2) > p(H3),
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states that the second set has a higher posterior probability than the first set if H2 does
not destroy the positive relevance between H1 and H3. We believe this is a plausible
assumption in this case. That is, we believe that the relevance between the proposition
that Walter is 31 years old, with a background in physics and philosophy etc. with
the proposition that Walter will attend the epistemology conference is strong enough
to not be completely destroyed by the report that he works at a bank. We show in
Appendix B that our result can also be put in the following way: the second set has a
higher posterior probability than the first set if adding H3 to H1 and H2 increases the
coherence, i.e. if SI I is more coherent than SI . The coherence increase has to be the
larger, the smaller the witness credibility.
Summarizing this section, we conclude that given some plausible assumptions about
the probabilities of the propositions in the Walter example, the second set does indeed
have a higher posterior probability than the first. And anyone who does not believe
that the second set is more probable than the first is irrational.
4 What Walter tells us about Linda
So far we have done a couple of things: We have introduced an example in which
intuitively it makes sense to argue that we are more justified in believing a conjunction
than one of its conjuncts. Furthermore, we have shown how taking the witness reports
into account supports this conclusion. Finally, we have shown that given a number of
assumptions about the witness and his reports, we can calculate that the posterior prob-
ability for the conjunction of the three propositions is indeed larger than the posterior
probability of the two propositions. This led us to the conclusion that participants who
do not assign the conjunction a higher probability are in fact irrational. The fallacy
has completely disappeared.
In these final two sections, we would like to pursue the argument that just as in
the Walter case, the participants in the Linda experiment, too, should assign a higher
probability to the conjunction. We will do this by pointing out how the same model
that we used above for Walter the Banker can also be applied to the Linda case.
Clearly, for this argument to succeed, we would need to show that both cases are
similar in all relevant respects. We believe that the three assumptions we make about
the probabilities (conditions (a), (b) and (c)), hold in both examples. Just replace the
propositions H1, H2 and H3 by the propositions H′1, H′2 and H′3 with
H′1: Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright, etc.
H′2: Linda is bank teller.
H′3: Linda is a feminist.
Nonetheless, there are also important differences between the Walter and the Linda
examples. We believe the two most important ones are:
(1) In the Linda experiment, the background information about Linda is assumed to
be certain while in the Walter example it is part of the analysis.
(2) In the Linda experiment the statements about Linda are not presented as reports
while in the Walter example they are.
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Let us take up each of these in turn. First, the reason why we do not take the back-
ground information about Walter as given is that we do not fully trust the source.
Clearly, in the Linda case the information is reported by a source as well: we have an
“experimenter” who tells us certain things about Linda. However, in the Linda case
the experimenter is supposed to be fully credible—the participants are supposed to
take for granted anything he or she tells them is the case. So even if we were to agree
to see the experimenter as a witness, we should assume this witness to be fully reliable
and should assign any statements he or she presents as facts with unit probability. As
assigning unit probability to the background information about Linda (i.e. H′1) would
make it impossible to exploit the confirmation given by the background information
to the proposition that Linda is a feminist (i.e. H′3), we could no longer adopt the same
reasoning as we did in the case of Walter above.
Nonetheless, we believe we should not immediately dismiss the possibility that the
source that reports the background information to us (to wit, the experimenter) is not
fully trustworthy. No doubt many of you have tried this example with friends or stu-
dents and, if so, we would expect that you, just as we did, recognized in your audience
at least some distrust, some slight uneasiness while they were trying to determine if,
and if so in which way, you were trying to trick them. Such uneasiness may even be
larger when put into an official experiment as everybody in the experiment knows that
the experimenter is not genuinely interested in what you believe about Linda.
However, if we cannot fully trust the experimenter to present true facts, we should
not assign any of his or her statements unit probability. This would immediately lead
us to assign less than unit probability to the background information provided about
Linda.
It would also make it much easier to argue that the statements the participants are
given are interpreted as reports by the experimenter as well. That is, it would allow us
to argue against difference (2) above by pointing out that participants may very well
view these statements as reports by the experimenter and feel as if they are asked to
judge which of these reports are more probable.7
And so we conclude that if we accept that the participants do not view the back-
ground information as having unit probability and if we accept that they view the
statements about Linda as reports by the experimenter, then the fallacy no longer
arises for plausible probability distributions.
In the recent literature there are quite a number of arguments that attempt to show
that the participants in the Linda example do not commit a fallacy. In Hertwig et al.
(2008), an overview is given of different arguments that attempt to show that the use
of the ‘AND’ operator in ordinary language is different from the ‘AND’ operator used
in propositional logic. Such arguments would lead us to conclude that the ‘and’ in
‘Linda is a bank teller and a feminist’ would be different from the corresponding
logical operator and so no fallacy arises.
7 Participants have also been found to commit the conjunction fallacy if no background information is
provided by the experimenter. To fit these cases into our account, we conjecture that the participants also
consider their background beliefs about the situation at stake (= H′′1) and proceed as described above. If this
conjecture is correct, however, our model has to be modified as the experimenter now only presents the
propositions H′′2 and H′′3. See also our fifth objection in the next section.
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Others have argued that although the fallacy does arise, it can be explained by
showing that the participants in the example are using some sort of rule that in other
cases would lead them to favor the proposition with the highest probability. So for
instance, Shogenji (2009) argues that participants favor the proposition with the high-
est epistemic justification, which in many cases coincides with the proposition with
the highest probability, though not always, as the Linda experiment shows. In a similar
vein, Crupi et al. (2008) and Atkinson et al. (2009) argue that participants choose the
proposition that has the highest degree of confirmation, which, again, often but not
always points us to the proposition with the highest probability (cf. Schupbach 2009a;
Tentori and Crupi 2009).
But note that our argument is different from either of these. However, we agree
with the second approach that we should analyze the ‘and’ by using the logical ‘AND’
operator, and we agree with the first approach that the participants are not making a
mistake in the Linda experiment. And so the participants would commit a fallacy if
they were not to assign the conjunction the highest probability. And we believe that
this is an argument that has not yet been defended by anybody.
Our argument is inspired by a proposal by Bovens and Hartmann (2003, ch. 3),
who analyze the Linda example by taking the corresponding reports into account and
showed that p(H′2, H′3|R′2, R′3) can be greater than p(H′3|R′3) for plausible probability
distributions. However, the analysis of Bovens and Hartmann differs from ours in
important respects: First, they assume that the background information about Linda
is certain, i.e. they effectively work with a probability function that conditions on H′1.
Secondly, Bovens and Hartmann model the witness credibility differently. While we
assume that an unreliable witness randomizes with the prior probability of the corre-
sponding proposition, Bovens and Hartmann introduce a randomization parameter a
(see Eq. 2) which is fixed and hence independent of the prior probability of the prop-
osition in question. We think that our assumption is descriptively more realistic and
normatively more appealing. What is more, our main results, captured in our theorem,
crucially depend on our way of modeling the witness credibility.
5 Anticipated objections
Clearly, the argument in the previous section is still quite tentative. For one thing,
we would need actual experimental data to support some of our statements about the
beliefs of the participants. But let us at least discuss a few possible objections that we
believe are especially noteworthy, as they may further explain our claim above.
First, one could insist that the experimenter is not part of the experiment and that she
can therefore simply not be modelled as a witness with a certain credibility. Clearly,
this is a critical assumption for our argument to succeed. Without it, we cannot argue
that the background information has a probability different from unity or that the
statements about Linda can be modelled as witness reports. We argued in favour of it
by pointing out that there is good reason to distrust the experimenter. We could argue
at length in favor of this argument, but in the end this is an empirical claim which
should be tested experimentally. This is simply not a question that philosophy alone
can answer.
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Second, one may object that no matter how the participants view the experimenter,
they can never be rational. For this type of experiment has also been conducted using
bets with actual money and the participants who put their money on the conjunction
instead of on one of the conjuncts will certainly end up losing money. But this would
be a misinterpretation of our argument. For we certainly do not believe that the partic-
ipants are assigning the correct probabilities to the propositions. Indeed, they are not.
For we all know that the experimenter can indeed be trusted (or at least with respect
to the propositions that he or she is reporting). Our point is rather that the participants
in the experiment may believe otherwise. That is, there is good reason to believe that
many of the participants will assign probabilities to the different propositions such
that they are fully rational in assigning a higher probability to the conjunction.
Third, similar experiments have been conducted in which experimental data are
used instead of a made-up story about Linda. In such experiments (which Hertwig
et al. 2008: 741 call ‘frequency representations’), the participants should know the
probabilities involved and we really have an independent experimenter. However, in
that case, too, the experimenter is still the person relating the story and the participants
still seem to have no a priori reason to expect the experimenter to be fully reliable with
regard to the information that he or she is reporting.
Fourth, one may wonder why, provided that our argument is correct, still a substan-
tial number of participants assign a larger probability to the first set. This, however, is
not difficult to answer: Our theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for
D(SI ,SI I ) > 0. If this condition is not satisfied, then it is rational to assign the first
set a higher posterior probability than the second set.
Fifth, one may point out that our model assumption that the witness is either a truth-
teller or a randomizer is highly idealized. After all, there seems to be a whole spectrum
of possibilities between truth-telling and randomizing. And why don’t we take into
account that the witness is deliberately lying? Moreover, one could criticize our inde-
pendence assumption either by arguing that it is too weak or mistaken in another way or
even by arguing that it is too strong and does not make sense in the case where we have
only a single witness. We respond that it is an empirical matter which mechanism for
the witness credibility is at work and which independences hold. This clearly depends
on the particular scenario under investigation. The goal of this paper was rather modest:
We only wanted to show that for a specific (though plausible) case rational participants
should assign a higher probability to the larger set of propositions. And this we did.
Finally, one may argue that condition (c) is implausible or ad hoc. It certainly is
not clear a priori whether participants who consider SI I to be more probably than SI
do indeed comply with this condition. We agree. This is an empirical questions and
corresponding experiments have to be conducted to test it. To do so, our model will
presumably have to be elaborated and better adapted to the Linda experiment.
Fortunately for us, this paper was meant as a first step in that direction and we think
that we can safely conclude that its goal has been accomplished.
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Appendix A: the posterior probability
From the Bayesian network in Fig. 1, we can read off an expression for the joint
probability over all variables (see Neapolitan 1990):
p(H1, . . . , Hn, R1, . . . , Rn, Rel) = p(H1, . . . , Hn) P(Rel)ni=1 p(Ri |Hi , Rel)
With this we can calculate
p(H1, . . . , Hn|R1, . . . , Rn) = p(H1, . . . , Hn, R1, . . . , Rn)p(R1, . . . , Rn) .
Let’s first calculate
p(H1, . . . , Hn, R1, . . . , Rn)=
∑
Rel
p(H1, . . . ,Hn, R1, . . . , Rn, Rel)
= [p(Rel)·1+p(¬Rel)ni=1 p(Hi)
] · p(H0, H1, . . . , Hn).
Similarly, we obtain:
p(R1, . . . , Rn) =
∑
H1,...,Hn ,Rel








p(H1, . . . , Hn)ni=1 p(Ri|Hi ,¬Rel)
= p(Rel) p(H1, . . . , Hn) + p(¬Rel)ni=1 p(Hi)
Putting it all together, we obtain Eq. 10.
Appendix B: proof of the theorem
To simplify the notation, we introduce the following abbreviations: hi := p(Hi) (for
i = 1, 2, 3), h12 := p(H1, H2), h123 := p(H1, H2, H3), r := p(Rel) and x := 1 − x
for all variables x . We assume that 0 < h1, h2, h3, h12, h123, r < 1 and obtain for the
difference function:
D(SI ,SI I ) = r + h1 h2 h3 rh123 r + h1 h2 h3r h123 −
r + h1 h2 r
h12 r + h1 h2 r h12
= h1 h2 r
{[
(1 − h12 h3) r + h1 h2 h3 r
]
h123 − [r + h1 h2 r ] h12 h3
}
(h123 r + h1 h2 h3r) (h12 r + h1 h2 r)
= h1 h2 h12 r
[
(1 − h12 h3) r + h1 h2 h3 r
]
(h123 r + h1 h2 h3r) (h12 r + h1 h2 r) · {h123/h12 − h3 (1 + δ)}
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with
δ = h12 r + h1 h2 r
(1 − h12 h3) r + h1 h2 h3 r
· h3.
Note that δ > 0. We conclude that D(SI ,SI I ) > 0 iff
h123/h12 > h3 · (1 + δ), (14)
which proofs the first part of the theorem as h123/h12 = p(H3|H1, H2).
It is interesting to note that δ is a negative function of h3 (proof omitted), i.e. the
larger h3, the smaller δ (and hence the “better” condition (c)).






· (1 + δ)






h1 · · · hn .





S · (1 + δ). (15)
Let us now examine the error measure δ. To do so, we plot δ as a function of the
probability of the background story (i.e. h1 with .01 < h1 < .99) for r = .5 and three
different sets of parameters, which satisfy conditions (a) and (b). The parameter sets
are:
Set 1: h2 = h3 = 0.1, h12 = 0.001, h13 = 0.009
Set 2: h2 = h3 = 0.05, h12 = 0.0005, h13 = 0.0495
Set 3: h2 = h3 = 0.01, h12 = 0.0001, h13 = 0.0099
As Fig. 2 shows, the error is small even for large values of the parameters.
Next, we examine the r -dependence of δ. To begin with, note that δ is strictly
monotonically decreasing for 0 < r < 1 with
lim





r ↗ 1 δ =
h12 (1 − h3)
1 − h12 (1 − h3) = h12 (1 − h3) (1 + O(h12)). (17)
8 Shogenji’s measure has been criticized. See, for instance, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) and Fitelson
(2003). For a recent defence of (a modified version of) Shogenji’s measure, see Schupbach (2009b).
It remains to be examined whether a condition similar to Eq. 15 obtains for other coherence measures
discussed in the literature.
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Fig. 2 The error measure δ for r = 0.5 as a function of h1 for set 1 (solid line), set 2 (dashed line) and set
3 (dotted line)








Fig. 3 The error measure δ as a function of r for set 4 (solid line), set 5 (dashed line) and set 6 (dotted line)
(Note that limr ↗ 1 D(SI ,SI I ) = 0 as p∗(SI ), p∗(SI I ) → 1 as r approaches 1 from







become increasingly good as r increases. Figure 3 illustrates this for the following
three parameter sets:
Set 4: h1 = 0.8, h2 = h3 = 0.1, h12 = 0.06
Set 5: h1 = 0.4, h2 = h3 = 0.05, h12 = 0.015
Set 6: h1 = 0.2, h2 = h3 = 0.01, h12 = 0.001
Figure 3 also show that condition (c) and the equivalent coherence condition (18) are
not good guides for values of r smaller than approximately .5. Equation 16 shows that
they are also not good guides for small values of h3. In these cases it is rational to
assign a higher probability to SI I than to SI only if the (Shogenji) coherence of SI I
is considerably greater than the (Shogenji) coherence of SI .
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